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1. Introduction  
The confluence of rising drug costs, more effective innovative medicines, and increasing 
public outrage have heightened criticism of the pharmaceutical industry and intensified the 
debate over pharmaceutical prices and access to medicines. As a consequence, policymakers 
and scholars from a variety of fields have argued for a reexamination of the patent system as 
an efficient mechanism for encouraging pharmaceutical innovation and drug development. 
The pharmaceutical industry is uniquely characterized by its production of a social good 
featuring high fixed costs, substantial informational and regulatory costs, and relatively low 
marginal costs of production. As such, pharmaceutical innovation is well suited to 
alternative incentive mechanisms to foster drug development. A variety of alternative 
mechanisms have been proposed, focusing on welfare improvements ranging from lower 
drug prices to increased consumer surplus, enhanced access to medicines and greater 
innovation.  
This chapter describes the pharmaceutical industry’s existing operating model as well as the 
subtleties of the current patent system and how it impacts drug development. Second, the 
chapter explores the characteristics that would make for a socially preferable, welfare-
enhancing mechanism. Next, the chapter reviews a number of proposed mechanisms and 
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each. The chapter then examines the 
overwhelming prevalence of “pull” mechanisms, those aimed at incentivizing successful 
innovation with prizes or other rewards, relative to “push” mechanisms which reduce the 
cost of research and development through funding awards. Following this, the chapter 
presents an analysis and comparison of the policy proposals, the similarities in their 
strengths and limitations, and the characteristics which would enhance the political 
feasibility of implementation. Finally, the chapter concludes with an appeal for the 
reexamination of the patent system and further exploration of the promise of alternative 
mechanisms to enhance access to medicines and incentivize additional research on 
neglected diseases.  
2. Current environment and challenges to drug development 
The minimum standards for pharmaceutical patent protection are defined by the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as set forth by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1995 at the end of the 
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Uruguay Round negotiations and requires that all WTO member states provide 20 years of 
market exclusivity for patented drugs. As a result, the generic products that characterized 
the pharmaceutical markets of many developing countries prior to TRIPS disappeared as 
stronger patent protection was adopted. Under TRIPS, generic producers must wait for 
patent expiry to bring generic versions to market.  
The apparatus embodied in the TRIPS Agreement encourage additional pharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D) by guaranteeing innovators a period of exclusivity during 
which they are able to recover their R&D investments. Without the protection provided by 
the patent system, innovators would have little incentive to invest in new technologies that 
could easily be copied and sold by their competitors. Such free riding on the initial 
investment constitutes a market failure that would stymie most innovation. The market 
exclusivity incentivizes firms to invest in the difficult and expensive research and 
development necessary for pharmaceutical advances. This incentive system is the heart of 
the static/dynamic tradeoff that characterizes the existing patent system. In exchange for 
temporary (20 years under the existing patent system) monopoly power, a static loss, new 
knowledge is forever brought into the public domain, a dynamic gain. While the existing 
patent system has addressed the market failure in one way, there are clearly problems with 
the current mechanism.  
Public health advocates argue that the patent protection afforded by the TRIPS Agreement is 
a significant determinant in establishing pharmaceutical prices and availability. Specifically, 
prior to the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries tended to have weaker patent 
protection (many had no patent protection for pharmaceuticals) which enabled generic drug 
producers to manufacture generic versions of drugs, even those still under patent protection 
in industrialized nations. Arguably, this created price competition and lowered drug prices. 
Critics point to the market exclusivity provided by TRIPS as raising drug prices and 
reducing availability in the developing world.  
Clearly this creates a barrier to access for many of the most vulnerable. In the context of 
access, “extreme poverty is universally the most important determinant. This is true both for 
individuals and for countries too poor to fund control efforts fully, still less to undertake 
needed research.” (Musgrove & Hotez, p.1694)  
While poverty and the existing patent system prevent some individuals who would benefit 
from medical innovations from buying them, a demand side problem, the existing patent 
system also suffers from problems on the supply side. Glennerster and Kremer (2000) 
adeptly identify four supply side issues that contribute to the insufficient incentives for 
innovation: potential purchasers are unwilling (or unable) to pay monopoly prices; some of 
the benefit from the innovation, in the form of consumer surplus, accrues to consumers; 
some of the benefit from the innovation is captured by consumers who purchase generic 
versions after patent expiry; and lastly, some of the benefit goes to other researchers who 
draw on the original innovation. The authors note that many studies estimate that 
innovators realize less than half their returns to their inventions. In a similar vein, Kremer 
(1998) estimates that the social value of a pharmaceutical innovation will be 2.5 times the 
private value. In essence, for developing countries, the existence of a market is constrained 
by the poverty of the patients as well as the inability of private researchers to capture the 
benefits of potential treatments.  
The problems embedded in the existing patent system are perhaps more significant in the 
realm of pharmaceuticals because of the lives that may be lost and the tremendous costs 
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associated with untreated diseases. “Some eighteen million human beings die prematurely 
each year from medical conditions we can cure – this is equivalent to fifty thousand 
avoidable deaths per day, or one-third of all human deaths.” (Pogge, p.182) Musgrove and 
Hotez (2009) provides an excellent description of the disease burden (death and disability) 
and economic costs (damage to children’s cognitive development and adults’ physical 
productivity) from neglected tropical diseases.  
Nevertheless, given the incentives created by the existing patent system, very few resources 
are devoted to the diseases of the poor. Pharmaceutical research is motivated by potential 
profits and the diseases endemic to developing nations and the limited purchasing power of 
these consumers hold little appeal. As described by the World Bank Group (2009), global 
health research spending is characterized by a 10/90 gap, i.e., less than 10 percent of global 
health research expenditures are devoted to conditions which account for more than 90 
percent of preventable mortality. This imbalance is perhaps best exemplified by the 
numbers on new drug approvals. Of the “1,556 new drugs approved between 1975 and 
2004, only 21 (1.3%) were specifically developed for tropical diseases and tuberculosis, even 
though these diseases account for 11.4% of the global disease burden.“ (DNDi, p.1) Notably, 
of these 21 drugs, five emerged from veterinary research. (Poggee, p.190) The absence of a 
profitable market for neglected tropical disease medicines directs research efforts and 
resources to other endeavors.  
Given the challenges surrounding pharmaceutical pricing, access to medicines, and research 
on neglected diseases, scholars, public health advocates and policymakers are working to 
overcome these challenges and design a better mechanism for incentivizing pharmaceutical 
innovation. In pursuit of a better mechanism, it is important to identify the points in the 
research and development process where the failures occur. Failures may occur at several 
stages of the drug development process: insufficient funding for research on neglected 
diseases, insufficient funding to take potentially promising research forward to the clinical 
development stage, and distribution problems that prevent existing treatments from 
reaching patients.  
Alternative mechanisms address these failures in one of three ways: those that work within 
the existing system (compulsory licensing, bulk buying, differential pricing), push 
mechanisms (research grants, government funding), and pull mechanisms (advance market 
commitment, prize funds, priority review vouchers). Push mechanisms incentivize 
pharmaceutical innovation by reducing the cost of research and development. Pull 
mechanisms remunerate welfare-enhancing innovations with prizes, supplemental profits 
or other rewards. All mechanisms seek to incentivize pharmaceutical research and 
development while overcoming particular flaws within the existing system. Greatest 
emphasis is placed on reducing the price of pharmaceutical innovations and incentivizing 
work on neglected diseases. Each mechanism is distinguished by its own advantages and 
limitations, providing a distinct set of benefits and disadvantages to compare to the existing 
system.  
3. Characteristics of a welfare-enhancing mechanism 
The alternative mechanisms considered below aim to improve upon the existing system, 
generating additional societal welfare and overcoming some of inefficiencies that plague the 
current patent regime. Ideally, a new mechanism would improve access to medicines, 
presumably through lower drug prices, and incentivize additional drug development for 
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the treatment of diseases endemic to developing nations. At the same time, a new 
mechanism would avoid the pitfalls that frequently accompany pharmaceutical innovation. 
This section describes the welfare-enhancing characteristics that would characterize a 
preferable mechanism as well as the inefficiencies that should be eliminated. The alternative 
mechanisms reviewed in the next section are then evaluated in light of the capacity to 
enhance social welfare and avoid these inefficiencies.  
Marginal cost pricing The global patent system and international pharmaceutical market 
currently engender differential pricing across countries. Through Ramsey Pricing 
pharmaceutical prices reflect the price elasticity of demand of consumers. The result is 
higher prices in industrialized nations and lower pharmaceutical prices in the developing 
world. Access to medicines could be enhanced through more affordable drug prices which 
would also reduce the deadweight losses associated with monopoly pricing. Most efficient 
would be marginal cost pricing, prices set equal to the cost of the additional inputs needed 
to produce one additional unit of output. Marginal cost pricing guarantees that anyone 
willing to pay the cost of production is able to purchase the good, increasing access and 
maximizing consumer welfare.  
Reduction of pharmaceutical counterfeiting The market exclusivity granted by the existing 
patent system may result in a substantial mark-up over marginal cost. This mark-up and the 
associated profitability of the pharmaceutical market create an attractive target for 
fraudulent production and pharmaceutical counterfeiting. Global health and the security of 
the international pharmaceutical supply chain would be enhanced if the incentive to 
counterfeit could be reduced.  
Increased R&D on treatments for neglected diseases with high social value As repeatedly noted 
above, the existing system fails to incentivize research on diseases of the poor due to the 
absence of a profit motive. Overcoming this obstacle to drug development for neglected 
diseases would enhance global social welfare and provide the potential for therapeutic relief 
to many of the world’s most vulnerable.  
Mechanisms for rewarding incremental innovation Although incremental innovations will 
contribute less to social welfare than innovations that are both first-in-class and best-in-class, 
it remains important to encourage follow-on innovation. An effective mechanism will 
reward innovations in proportion to their therapeutic value and will also allow original 
innovators to capture a share of the returns from all follow-on innovations spurred by the 
initial advance.  
Continued commitments to safety and efficacy Any alternative mechanism should preserve the 
existing system’s commitment to safety and efficacy, ensuring the health of the patient 
above all. While more rapid review times increase firm profitability, these incentives should 
not come at the cost of assured safety.  
Reduction of excessive marketing Critics frequently point to excessive marketing expenditures 
within the pharmaceutical industry as a significant contributor to high drug prices. An 
effective alternative mechanism would incentivize firms to reduce this spending, in essence 
de-linking profitability and marketing efforts. Elimination of these costs would reduce drug 
costs and should help to lower prices.  
Preservation of the incentives to innovate Alternative mechanisms should preserve the 
incentives that are in place that encourage innovative activity and foster creativity. 
Although flawed, the existing patent system effectively does this and has successfully 
rewarded inventors with returns to their innovations, encouraging a continued stream of 
innovations and advances.  
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Reduced launch times In its current form, the international pharmaceutical market is 
characterized by differential prices such that drugs are sold at a premium in some countries 
over others. Given this, firms have an incentive to launch new products in the most 
profitable nations first, those characterized by higher prices and stronger patent protection. 
The result may be a significant delay in launch dates for less profitable, frequently 
developing nation, markets. Reduced launch times, as facilitated by an alternative 
mechanism, improve global welfare as innovative treatments reach patients more quickly.  
Low information costs Alternative mechanisms will ideally require limited, easily attainable 
information for adoption. Significant informational requirements or difficult (impossible) to 
obtain information will drive up the cost of implementation.  
Reduced duplicative research and development of “me too” drugs The existing patent system and 
the resultant monopoly prices incentivizes innovators to dedicate R&D efforts to drugs that 
are unique enough for a patent award but may provide little or no therapeutic advance. 
“According to the US Food and Drug Administration, over 77% of the drugs approved from 
1990-2004 were duplicative rather than breakthrough drugs.” (Ravvin, p.112 citing a 2005 
report by the US Food and Drug Administration) While providing the innovating firm with 
a return, such duplicative research efforts are an inefficient use of scarce research talent and 
financial resources. An improved mechanism would provide greater incentives for 
breakthrough therapies and reduce the incentives for “me too” drugs.  
4. Review of the alternatives to the existing patent system 
As envisioned, the existing patent system seeks to balance the static inefficiency of the 
temporary monopoly power guaranteed by a patent grant and the dynamic benefits of 
knowledge spillovers resulting from the sharing of the patented knowledge. While providing 
incentives to innovate, many argue that the current system has failed the developing world. 
High drug prices and a dearth of treatments for many neglected and tropical diseases 
constitute barriers to access to medicines for many patients in the developing world. 
Frustration with the status quo has driven the call for a reexamination of the patent system 
and resulted in the development of several alternative mechanisms. The challenges of 
reforming the patent system and balancing the pharmaceutical industry’s incentive to 
innovate with widespread access to medicines have been approached by numerous scholars in 
a variety of ways. This section considers nine proposals that have addressed this challenge. 
Each proposal is described and evaluated in turn. The mechanisms proposed utilize different 
means to reward pharmaceutical innovation and vary in their ability to enhance access 
through lower pharmaceutical prices while simultaneously providing a reward to the 
innovator that would be proportional to the social value of the innovation.  
The proposals analyzed here all advocate changes to the existing patent system, through a 
variety of creative mechanisms advocated from a variety of perspectives. These works date 
back as far as 1998, and each is characterized by its own set of advantages and challenges, 
though there is significant overlap in both areas. Each of the proposals is described and 
examined below.  
4.1 Abramowicz (2003) 
Description: The Abramowicz proposal provides an evaluation of a prize system from the 
perspective of public administration. This mechanism relies on a retrospective reward 
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system to complement the existing patent system. As described, the innovators have the 
option to elect the prize system, but the decision to participate is irrevocable. Given that the 
administrative agency has the ability to tailor the procedure for valuing the innovation to 
the particular patent, the mechanism is flexible which is very attractive. This mechanism 
provides for the government to reward firms that surrender their patents. The proposal is 
designed such that the prize is proportional to the patent’s value relative to the total value of 
prize submissions.  
Advantages: The Abramowicz mechanism places patents in the public domain, which reduces 
the static inefficiency associated with monopoly power and the associated deadweight losses. 
Since the technology is in the public domain, the incentives for “me too” drugs and inventing 
around existing patents is reduced, removing an additional inefficiency inherent in the existing 
system. Moreover, projects that would produce high social value that may not be pursued by 
private firms are incentivized for development through this mechanism. 
Limitations: The administrative agency operationalizing this mechanism will require 
significant amounts of information in order to estimate the value of the innovation. This 
information will be both difficult and expensive to collect, when it is available. In addition, 
the innovating firm must also have a great deal of information to accurately determine the 
quantity of resources to devote to research and development. Specifically, firms require 
information in order to accurately estimate the social value of every project for which the 
prize is sought in order to calculate potential returns and the efficient level of investment. 
Finally, the Abramowicz mechanism is administrated by a government body and is 
therefore subject to the bureaucratic weaknesses and inefficiencies which characterize 
government control.  
4.2 Civan (2009) 
Description: Civan proposes extending the patent length beyond 20 years for treatments for 
diseases which disproportionally affect developing nations. The additional years of patent 
protection are argued to increase the incentives to research treatments for neglected 
diseases. Citing the work of Diwan and Rodrik (1991), Civan suggests that patent protection 
in developing countries could be as much as one and one half times that of patent protection 
in industrialized countries (20 years under the World Trade Organization).  
Advantages: Increased patent length would extend the period of time that pharmaceutical 
innovators would have to recoup their R&D investment, enhancing the incentive to research 
treatments for neglected diseases. This mechanism would be very easy and inexpensive to 
implement, a law change in participating developing nations would be sufficient. 
Limitations: The Civan proposal takes its recommendations from early papers, specifically from 
static models that may fail to capture important dynamics of the global pharmaceutical 
market. While enhancing the incentives for research on neglected and tropical diseases, this 
mechanism would increase the patent length and result in monopoly prices for drugs for a 
longer period of time in the developing world. Granting that pharmaceutical companies price 
discriminate, this would still lead to higher prices for the most vulnerable consumers. Given 
the tremendous opposition to any patent protection for pharmaceuticals in the developing 
world, one can imagine tremendous opposition to this mechanism by poor nations.  
4.3 Grabowski, Ridley & Moe (2006, 2009) 
Description: The essence of this policy proposal is the award of a priority review voucher 
(PRV) to any innovator that gains US FDA (or European Agency for the Evaluation of 
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Medicinal Products) approval for a new pharmaceutical or biological treatment for a 
neglected tropical disease that is shown to be clinically superior to existing treatments. The 
value of the voucher is that it entitles the bearer to a priority review for another drug 
submitted for US FDA approval. In contrast to the 15 months required for a standard 
review, the median review time for a priority review is approximately seven months. The 
authors find that getting a new drug to market more quickly, even measured in mere 
months, can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Advantages: The US Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
of 2007 in September of that year, based on this policy proposal. In September 2009 the PRV 
program went into effect and the first voucher was awarded to Novartis following the US 
FDA approval of their anti-malarial drug, Coartem. The priority review voucher is 
transferable and may either be used or sold by the innovating company. As demonstrated 
by the experience of the US FDA, the mechanism is straightforward to adopt and 
operationalize. Regulatory standards for safety and efficacy are preserved, though the 
priority review does require additional resources at the US FDA to quickly analyze the 
additional data. The authors claim that the priority review will increase costs to the 
regulatory agency by approximately $1 million per review, though this cost is paid by the 
innovative firm and amounts to only a small fraction of the value of the voucher. The 
incentives provided by the priority review voucher are also highly efficient because the 
innovating firm is able to determine which treatments should be pursued based on internal 
information and evaluation, increasing the likelihood of success. The incentives provided by 
the voucher will allow for faster access to blockbuster drugs and increased research on 
neglected tropical diseases. Based on a study of historical data, Grabowski and Kyle (2007) 
estimates that the priority review voucher may increase the effective patent life for drugs 
facing generic entry. In addition, the value of the priority review voucher creates a market 
mechanism for identifying those drugs for which expedited review is most efficient. Finally, 
this policy proposal is complementary to other push and pull mechanisms that may be 
adopted.  
Limitations: The proposal requires the US FDA to employ additional resources in order to 
quickly evaluate the additional regulatory data. The mechanism does not provide for how 
the treatment will reach patients in developing countries, implementation challenges remain 
for enhancing access to the medicines. In like manner, while this proposal enhances the 
incentives for R&D, it fails to address high drug prices as a barrier to access since the 
mechanism does not specify any conditions on the affordability of the price of the medicinal 
intervention.  
4.4 Hollis (2004, 2005) 
Description: The Hollis proposal aims to overcome two of the most significant shortcomings 
of the existing patent system: the high drug prices which prevent widespread access, and 
the lack of incentives for research and development on diseases endemic in developing 
countries. As envisioned, patent rights are relinquished in exchange for a reward calculated 
to be proportional to the incremental therapeutic benefit of the technology. As an optional 
reward mechanism, the proposal suggests that this system would operate in conjunction 
with the current patent system. Key to the Hollis mechanism is the development of an 
International Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund which would be the source of payments to 
innovators surrendering their patent rights. Participants would agree to freely license all 
patents related to the drug when used for developing country markets in exchange for 
payments for a period of perhaps twelve years.  
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Advantages: This mechanism serves as a complement to the existing patent system. The 
optional reward mechanism would incentivize the development of innovations that provide 
high social value but are distinguished by low appropriability, precisely the characteristics 
needed to generate research into neglected diseases. Beyond incentivizing the research, this 
mechanism also enhances access and reduces deadweight losses by avoiding monopoly 
pricing. As described, the drugs would be competitively produced and sold at the average 
cost of production, increasing access for the poor and vulnerable in the developing world. 
As an additional benefit, the reward is calculated to be proportional to the innovation’s 
social value as determined by a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) measure of disease burden, 
which includes both the quality and the quantity of life lived. In principle, the use of a 
QALY measure will provide more information than a market-price valuation, and avoid 
some of the agency and informational problems that currently characterize pharmaceutical 
markets.  
Limitations: In order to operationalize the Hollis proposal, both the administrative agency 
and the innovating firm must have a great deal of information about the value and cost of 
the innovation. Determination of the reward requires calculations of both pharmaceutical 
sales and QALYs for covered innovations, which may be difficult and costly to attain. For 
the innovator, R&D investment decisions are based on information about the expected social 
value of every successful drug in order to calculate the innovator’s relative share of the total 
reward. The mechanisms may induce bureaucratic abuses including regulatory capture and 
corruption, as well as attempts at gaming the system. Finally, the proposal lacks details on 
the funding and management of the International Pharmaceutical Innovation Fund.  
4.5 Hubbard & Love (2004) 
Description: The Hubbard and Love proposal is based on the establishment of a national 
R&D contribution with a suggested value of 0.1% of national Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). In line with the existing patent system and current market mechanisms, this 
contribution could be achieved through the purchase of patent protected drugs (under the 
assumption that national expenditure on pharmaceuticals is approximately 1% of GDP and 
a tenth of the revenue from drug sales is ploughed back into research and development). 
Alternatively, nations that financed their R&D contribution in other ways (for example 
through direct funding of drug development) could place drug patents into the public 
domain, allowing for competitive production.  
Advantages: This mechanism would operate in conjunction with the existing patent system. 
For those countries electing alternative means of making their R&D contribution, weaker 
patent protection would provide for competitive production, lower prices and enhanced 
access to medicines. In addition, the proposal would eliminate the need for excessive drug 
marketing and the associated deadweight losses. In principle, funding for pharmaceutical 
research and development is sustained without the welfare losses generated by monopoly 
pricing. The authors also claim that R&D resources will be drawn into the areas of greatest 
need, though the means by which this will happen is not clear or described.  
Limitations: This proposal primarily suffers from informational and measurement 
challenges. The Hubbard and Love proposal lacks any information on the specifics 
necessary to operationalize the mechanism: how to calculate and establish the contribution 
norm, means of global coordination, establishment of an administrative body, distribution 
of the contribution funds, and design of acceptable alternative mechanisms. Finally, this 
mechanism requires significant government oversight and control.  
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4.6 Kremer (1998) 
Description: This paper proposes employing a government auction to estimate the private 
value of patents, then providing an opportunity to buy out the patent at a multiple of this 
value. In an effort to overcome the insufficient incentives for such research, the multiple 
would approximate the social value of the innovation. Innovators could opt to sell the 
patent or retain their rights to the technology. Given a government purchase, patents would 
be placed in the public domain. In order to avoid distortions and to induce accurate 
valuations, a fraction of patents would be sold to the highest bidder according to 
government randomization.  
Advantages: The principle advantage of this mechanism is the elimination of monopoly 
pricing through the placement of patents into the public domain. At the same time, the 
private incentives to innovate are enhanced to levels closer to the social value since the 
government aims to establish the buyout at this value. Kremer’s proposal provides a market 
mechanism, specifically auctions, to value innovations and provides for substituting and 
complementary patents. Patent holders would have the ability to request a second auction in 
those cases. An additional advantage is the reduced incentive for duplicative research on 
“me too drugs” through the auction mechanism. Since the patent-generated distortions are 
severe in the pharmaceutical industry, this mechanism is especially well-suited to this 
technology. In addition, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval process will 
automatically generate a great deal of the information necessary to value the innovation.  
Limitations: A significant criticism of the Kremer mechanism is that transferring the patent 
into the public domain would reduce the incentive for follow-on research and further 
development. That is, in the pharmaceutical industry additional clinical development 
frequently occurs only after a predetermined sales threshold is reached. As such, this 
proposal may be best suited to the development of vaccines and other specialty products 
that are narrowly focused with specific, well-defined clinical objectives. In addition, the 
Kremer mechanism relies upon the assumption that auction participants honestly reveal 
their valuation of the innovation. Although the government’s randomized auction 
(government purchase of the innovation or sale to the highest bidder) should induce honest 
valuations, the proposal remains vulnerable to collusion among bidders or bribery from the 
patent owner.  
4.7 Lanjouw (2002) 
Description: This proposal is predicated on the existence of two types of nations, rich and 
poor, and two separable drug markets: one for global diseases, such as cancer, and one for 
diseases endemic to developing nations, such as malaria. In the case of global diseases, 
Lanjouw’s mechanism would require innovating firms to elect to exercise their patent rights 
in either rich countries or poor countries. This would be done as part of the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) foreign application process, through a declaration attached to 
the request for a foreign filing license. Nations generating perhaps two percent or less of 
total global pharmaceutical profit would be defined as poor. For diseases endemic to 
developing countries, the incentives derived from the patent system would remain in place 
to encourage innovation. For global diseases with a high incidence in all nations, patent 
rights exclusive to rich nations would result in competing firms in developing countries 
where patent protection was not elected, ultimately bringing prices down for developing 
country residents. As nations developed and markets evolved, the license declaration would 
be updated to reflect these changes.  
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Advantages: The Lanjouw proposal targets patent protection by disease and by country. The 
mechanism draws on the information advantages possessed by the firm regarding the links 
between patents, products and diseases, as well as information on the relative size of 
national markets. The proposal would increase access to medicines in the developing world, 
for global diseases, while maintaining existing incentives for research on neglected diseases. 
Finally, the mechanism would be easy and inexpensive to implement, both of which are 
significant advantages.  
Limitations: As envisioned, the Lanjouw proposal requires separation of markets to permit 
price discrimination. This will be made more difficult by increased globalization, 
international arbitrage and internet sales. Although the poor nation markets are quite small 
(two percent), the loss of market power in these countries will (marginally) reduce the 
incentives to innovate. This mechanism requires information about market size and global 
pharmaceutical sales that may be difficult to collect. In addition, operationalizing this 
alternative will require consensus in measurement and in the establishment of the profit 
share benchmark. Moreover, the policy change describe in this proposal is already available 
to interested firms on a voluntary basis. One imagines that, however small, the loss of sales 
revenue from surrendering patent protection is not profitable and therefore the elect not to. 
Presumably this also indicates that innovative firms would resist the adoption of the 
changes presented by this mechanism. Finally, the Lanjouw proposal is subject to the lack of 
stability and consistency in governments’ decision-making which may be corrupt, irrational 
and unpredictable.  
4.8 Lybecker & Freeman (2006, 2007) 
Description: The Lybecker & Freeman proposal rewards innovative firms based on the social 
value of their drug. The pharmaceutical innovator would receive direct tax credits in 
exchange for marginal cost pricing, based on production and distribution. The calculation of 
social value (the sum of consumer and producer surplus) will be based on one year of 
benchmark sales at market prices, reflecting private value of the innovation. A multiple of 
this figure will then be utilized to calculate compensation for the patent holder. Participation 
by innovative firms is voluntary and participation requires marginal cost pricing or 
licensing the patent for generic production. National participation is also voluntary. 
Participating nations buy in by providing a share of the financing which is a function of the 
social value, national disease burden and per capita GDP.  
Advantages: While government involvement is inherent in the Lybecker & Freeman 
mechanism, the valuation of the innovation continues to be established by market forces. If 
the innovation offers a therapeutic benefit, a market will emerge in the benchmark year. The 
efficiency of tax credits is established in earlier work which has shown that one dollar in tax 
credits for R&D is associated with one dollar increase in R&D expenditure at the margin. 
Duplicative innovations will capture smaller market share and garner smaller direct tax 
credits. In addition, this mechanism transfers the burden of R&D financing from those 
afflicted with a particular disease to all taxpayers, and with global adoption halts the US 
subsidization of pharmaceutical research and development. Given that firms are expected to 
freely license the technology, generic competition should emerge to reduce prices to 
competitive levels in participating nations. Moreover, the mechanism should improve global 
product dissemination and reduce the launch delays that currently characterize developing 
country markets.  
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Limitations: Implementation will require significant international cooperation on pricing, 
estimation of social value, financing shares (proportional disease burden and per capital 
GDP), and reimbursement policies. These calculations will be particularly difficult to make 
for the least developed countries. In addition, there will be an incentive to manipulate the 
figures to lower the share of compensation. Since peak sales are reached three to five years 
post-launch and this proposal uses one benchmark year, this mechanism may underestimate 
the social value of the innovation. Moreover, given that a single benchmark year is utilized 
to calculate market valuation, marketing practices may intensify pre-launch and in the 
benchmark year. Marginal cost pricing is admittedly difficult to estimate and will be a 
challenging aspect of implementing this proposal. Internet sales and transhipment to non-
participating nations may make enforcement difficult. Finally, while the Lybecker and 
Freeman proposal should lower drug prices and increase access to medicines to developing 
countries, it does not provide additional incentives for research into treatments for neglected 
diseases.  
4.9 Pogge (2005) 
Description: The Pogge proposal would provide a mechanism to operate in tandem with the 
existing patent system. Innovative firms would have the option to surrender their 
conventional patent rights in exchange for an alternative patent which would reward them 
with a guaranteed payment stream in proportion to the health impact of their medical 
intervention during its initial 10-12 years of availability. The patent hold would have two 
options for implementation: grant of an open license to generic producers, or maintaining 
exclusive production of the drug under the condition that reward payments would be 
reduced by the amount of sales revenues.  
Advantages: Innovative firms would have incentives to develop cost-effective technologies 
with the maximum health impact. Generic production as well as marginal cost (or less) 
pricing would be incentivized to maximize access and health improvements among all 
populations, including the global poor. The mechanism would also discourage duplicative 
research efforts and excessive marketing. The costs of research and development would be 
borne globally, by all taxpayers, rather than by those afflicted with a particular disease or 
condition.  
Limitations: Significant challenges are presented by the necessity for measuring an 
appropriate reward, quantifying the global disease burden and assessing the health impact 
of new medical interventions, a particularly difficult charge in the context of combination 
therapies (the so called AIDS “triple cocktail”). In addition, the mechanism requires the 
coordination of governments and the pharmaceutical industry. The necessary consensus on 
essential and nonessential drugs may be contentious and subject to political battles and 
gamesmanship. Moreover, implementation is contingent on raising the resources needed for 
the Health Impact Fund, an estimated US $45-$90 billion annually, a formidable challenge. 
Pogge problematically asserts that pharmaceutical companies may be willing to bear the 
additional costs of widespread accessibility, such as improved infrastructure and 
distribution systems. As argued by Sonderholm (2010), due to the free rider problem, an 
individual firm has little incentive to invest in the expensive efforts that would then benefit 
all firms. Finally, there must be agreement on the allocation of the costs across nations, a 
negotiation process that promises to be difficult and contentious.  
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Table 1 below presents a snapshot of the characteristics of each of these proposals, briefly 
summarizing the authors’ perspective, the essence of the proposed mechanism, the 
proposal’s goal, as well as the primary criticisms and advantages of each.  
 
 Perspective Mechanism Goal Criticism Advantages 
Abramowicz Lawyer Retrospective  
Reward based on 
social value 
Reduce 
DWL,  
Access 
Government control,  
No specifics, 
Informational 
Requirements 
Patents in public 
domain, 
Complements 
patent system 
Civan Economist Longer patent 
length in 
developing 
nations 
Therapeutic 
Need 
Coordination between 
nations, Requires lots 
of participating 
countries, Bad for 
global diseases 
Market 
mechanism, Easy 
to implement 
Grabowski, 
Ridley & 
Moe 
Economists Priority Review 
Voucher 
Therapeutic 
Need, Lower 
Prices 
Smaller prize value 
than APC, Potential 
for limited clinical 
benefits, Safety risks of 
Priority Reviewed 
Drugs 
Operationalized 
and in place 
 
Market 
mechanism at 
work, Low cost to 
taxpayers, faster 
access 
Hollis Economist Reward system 
via innovation 
fund,  
QALY 
Measurement 
Therapeutic  
Need, 
Access 
Government control,  
Difficult measurement 
 
Complements 
patent system, 
Reward linked to 
therapeutic 
benefit 
Hubbard & 
Love 
Consumer 
Advocate 
National 
contribution 
norm via 
alternative R&D 
funding models 
Therapeutic 
Need, Lower 
Prices 
No Specifics, 
Government Control 
Continued R&D 
fund via 
mandated 
contribution 
Kremer Economist Patent Buyout via 
Auction 
mechanism 
Reduce 
DWL, 
Pay Social 
Value 
Collusion,  
Further development 
discouraged 
Market 
Mechanism 
Public domain 
patents 
Lanjouw Economist Patents tailored 
to two different 
drug markets 
Therapeutic 
Need, 
Access 
Enforcing separate 
markets, Industry 
cooperation 
Low cost, Easy to 
Implement  
Lybecker & 
Freeman 
Economists Direct Tax 
Credits to fund 
innovation 
Therapeutic 
Need, 
Access, 
Lower Prices 
Difficult 
measurement, 
consensus,  
global cooperation 
Marginal Cost 
pricing, faster 
launch times, 
reduced 
duplicative 
research 
Pogge Political 
Scientist 
Reward system 
based on health 
impact 
Therapeutic 
Need, 
Lower Prices 
Publicly funded, 
challenging 
measurement, global 
cooperation necessary 
Incentive to 
maximize health 
benefit, incentives 
for cost-effective 
drugs 
Table 1. Summary of Proposals 
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The selection of proposals examined here represents a variety of perspectives, from 
economist to lawyer to political scientist, and utilize a variety of mechanisms to incentivize 
drug development, from auction to tax policy to license declaration. The objectives of most 
of the proposals focus on improved access to medicines for the poor, especially patients in 
developing nations, enhanced research on neglected diseases and reduced deadweight loss. 
Unfortunately there is also great commonality in the limitations of the mechanisms: large 
(sometimes impossible) informational requirements, tremendous government involvement, 
dearth of details, and coordination challenges.  
5. Comparison and analysis 
This section seeks to compare and contrast the nine proposals presented above. Specifically, 
given the alternative policy proposals considered here, the following questions must be 
answered: How do they differ and how are they most similar? Which are the most 
politically feasible? What are the greatest advantages? What are the most significant 
limitations?  
As described earlier, alternatives to the existing patent system fall into three categories: 
those that work within the existing system, push mechanisms and pull mechanisms. Push 
mechanisms reduce the cost of research and development while pull mechanisms reward 
successful innovation with prizes, supplemental profits, or some other reward. In essence, 
push mechanisms reward effort while pull mechanisms reward results. Of the policy 
proposals considered here, eight of the nine would be described as pull mechanisms. The 
sole push mechanism is the one advocated by Hubbard and Love (2004) which proposes a 
national R&D contribution nom to be met by any means, which could then expand direct 
funding for drug development.  
The remaining eight proposals are all forms of pull mechanisms ranging from priority 
review vouchers to longer patent lives in developing nations, to direct tax credits. Given that 
so many of these proposals focus on pull mechanisms, one must ask whether this is a 
superior approach to the challenges surrounding neglected diseases and barriers to access. 
In an excellent discussion of the comparative advantages of push vs. pull mechanisms Grace 
and Kyle (2009) examine the strengths and weaknesses of each. In the context of pull 
mechanisms, there are several important advantages. Grace and Kyle note that economic 
principal-agent models suggest that pull mechanisms are superior when agents are not 
capital constrained, when it is straightforward to specify the desired innovation and its 
specific characteristics, and when the principal is risk-averse. Perhaps most advantageous is 
the fact that pull mechanisms only reward successful outcomes. This correctly aligns the 
firms’ incentives: only those whose chances of success are great enough will be willing to 
invest the resources necessary for research and development. The market mechanisms work 
to ensure those best able to succeed are those most likely to participate. Pull mechanisms 
allow for the contributions of a large, varied and disperse group of experts and researchers. 
While this may increase the speed of innovation, it may also risk duplicative research 
efforts. On the other hand, Grace and Kyle argue that push mechanisms may be considered 
superior when effort is easy to monitor and measure and when the principal has a greater 
tolerance for risk. An important advantage of push funding is the elimination of research 
and development risk since the funding is assured regardless of results. This is particularly 
beneficial for encouraging basic research, though it is arguably inefficient since many 
funded research efforts are unsuccessful and de-linking risk and reward may incentivize 
less fruitful efforts.  
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The pull characteristic is not the only similarity across the proposals considered in this 
chapter. Importantly, the majority of mechanisms are focused on incentivizing research on 
those diseases for which there is greatest therapeutic need and enhancing access to 
medicines through lower drug prices. Though the means to the end are very different across 
the proposals, the goals are virtually identical.  
The proposals are also characterized by similar advantages and limitations. Perhaps the 
most common advantage seen across the alternative mechanisms is the reliance on a market 
mechanism to incentivize invention and determine the valuation of the innovation. This 
both ensures that resources are invested prudently (risks are balanced against potential 
returns) and that research efforts are pursued by the most efficient firms. In the case of the 
limitations, those most frequently cited are informational requirements and 
coordination/cooperation challenges. The uncertainty surrounding both of these elements 
poses a noteworthy challenge to implementation in each case.  
Finally, it is important to consider which of the nine policy proposals are the most politically 
feasible. In this spirit, it is valuable to reflect on the Priority Review Voucher (Grabowski, 
Ridley and Moe) which went into effect in the United States in September of 2009. Several 
aspects of this mechanism are politically attractive and important to the likelihood of 
adoption. First, this mechanism is optional for the firm. This ensures greater buy-in by the 
industry, which will be favourably received by policymakers as well. It is also voluntary at 
the national level. While the United States is now experimenting with the Priority Review 
Voucher, other nations have the option of instituting a similar mechanism to enhance their 
patent systems as well. In addition, mechanisms that complement the existing system will 
be easier and less costly to adopt than those that require a new institutional architecture for 
adoption. Again, such mechanisms would be implementable at the discretion of national 
authorities. Lastly, the most politically feasible mechanisms will utilize the market forces 
which preserve the incentives to innovate through potential profits. Market forces are highly 
efficient and ensure that resources are invested only when risk levels and expected returns 
warrant that investment.  
Overall it is apparent that the majority of creative thinking in the realm of alternatives 
patent mechanisms utilize pull mechanisms to both incentivize research on neglected 
diseases as well as lower drug prices to enhance access to medicines. While the policy 
proposals vary greatly in the design of their mechanisms, there are tremendous similarities 
in their strengths and limitations. Ultimately the value of these proposals will lie in the 
change they engender: through their implementation and/or the creative thinking they 
inspire. While only one of these proposals has been operationalized, it is clear that there is a 
set of identifiable characteristics making adoption more politically feasible and therefore 
likely.  
6. Conclusions 
The current policy debate over pharmaceutical patents and drug development is largely 
focused on the high prices which create a barrier to access for many consumers in the 
developing world. An obvious tension exists between public health policy and shareholder 
expectations. Emotionally charged discussions frequently ignore the importance of research 
and development funding to a productive pipeline of therapeutic compounds and new 
pharmaceutical compounds. The growing public outrage has inspired scholars and 
policymakers to re-examine the patent system and search for alterative mechanisms capable 
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of incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation which simultaneously ensuring greater access to 
medicines.  
This chapter presents a review of nine alternative policy proposals seeking to reward 
innovation while improving social welfare. As an industry which produces social goods 
characterized by high fixed and/or sunk costs and relatively low marginal costs of 
production, the pharmaceutical industry is well-suited to an alternative mechanism which 
may greatly improve global social welfare. The challenges of improving access to medicines 
and incentivizing research on neglected diseases demand creative thinking to overcome the 
tremendous loss of life and quality of life. Although the advantages to these proposals are 
significant, each is also characterized by costs and drawbacks that limit the potential for 
implementation. In spite of this, growing frustration with the existing system and increasing 
criticism of the pharmaceutical industry point to the need for consideration of alternatives 
and indicate these policy proposals are worth exploring.  
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